norms over time. Rather, these limits became visible only when the universalistic claims of jus gentium were fractured from without by forces released in two a-rational historical developments: firstly, by the 'Reformation' splintering of European cultures into armed religious and political regions, which gave rise to rival forms of jus naturae et gentium each claiming universality; and second by resistance that jus gentium -and other 'universal' forms of European religious and philosophical thought -met in New World encounters, but only to the extent that his resistance was armed and forcible.
If this is so then we cannot approach the history of jus naturae et gentium as if it were governed by a global principle of justice: one whose unfolding in a universal history imbues us 'critical' moderns with a truly cosmopolitan norm of international justice, against which we can comfortably measure the moral deficits of our ancestors. Rather we must approach this history at the convergence of two lines of historiographic inquiry: firstly into the disparate intellectual sources -the metaphysical anthropologies and cosmologies, the political philosophies and juridical cultures -from which rival jus gentium discourses were fashioned; and second into the conflicting religious, juridical and political programs in whose interests jus gentium discourses were fashioned, and to whose historical fate they were tied. This history of jus naturae et gentium is thus not that of the revelation of its particularism in the course of a universal history of reason, at the centre of which sits its colonialist use. Rather it is a history tied to the unforeseeable and uncontrollable outcomes of the conflicts between the religious and political programs in which jus gentium was anchored -including inter alia colonising programs -among which outcomes are to be found modern philosophical and contextual historiography themselves.
The paper develops this line of argument in four stages, arguing that the critical or philosophical historiography of jus gentium 'Eurocentrism' is embedded in the same array of Eurocentric intellectual cultures as jus gentium itself (I); that jus naturae et gentium was not born as the ideology of early modern European colonialism (or modern imperialism) but emerged in variegated forms over a longer period, as the shifting matrix for ordering the relations between European religious, juridical, and political cultures (II); that jus gentium did not consist fundamentally in true (universal) or ideological (particularist) ideas, but in deep-seated intellectual cultures whose role was to form a particular 'persona' or way of acceding to truth (III); and finally that the limits or particularism of jus gentium discourses were revealed not by a universal idea of justice that they failed to realise, but by irreducible conflicts among the religious, juridical and political programs in which they were anchored, all of which produced regional conceptions of justice claiming to be 'universal' (IV).
I
As exemplified in our epigraph, in treating early modern jus naturae et gentium as the ideological origin of modern -state-centred, imperialist -international law, critical historiography grounds its critique of jus gentium particularism or regionality on social-theoretic and philosophical premises tacitly assumed to be universal. It is highly likely, though, that the theoretical and philosophical premises of this critique are themselves European-specific; that is, accessible only to those iteratively trained in an array of regional university-based European intellectual cultures. 4 If so then we will have to give up the idea that the particularism or regionality of jus gentium discourses can be comprehended and condemned on the philosophical or theoretical basis of its failure to be universal.
In order to argue this case in the space available, we can construct a composite of the critical historiography of jus gentium, acknowledging a degree of over-unification in doing so. Centrally, this historiography claims that early modern jus naturae et gentium originated as the ideological justification for the European colonisation of the New World, and that a state-centred and imperialistic modern international law is its direct descendant. 5 The core intellectual components of jus naturae et gentium are thus supposed to have been ideas or doctrines declaring the intellectual and moral 4 For examples of the emerging discussion of the regional character of European philosophical cultures, see Karol Bal, Volker Caysa, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, (eds.), Philosophie und Regionalität (Breslau: Wroclaw University Press, 1999). People's in International Law (2004) and Reynolds' Aboriginal Sovereignty (1996) , while also informing Anghie's Imperialism, Sovereignty and International Law (2004) . It can also be found in implacable defence of Vitoria's jus gentium in Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150 -1625 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997 Kant's own articulation of the principle of cosmopolitan right -in terms of rational beings inhabiting a physical globe -has been reworked by Rawls and Habermas. Unlike the Catholic natural-law doctrine, here the focus is not on universal national self-determination but on global democratic will-formation, seen most clearly in John Rawls, If, however, we examine the three constructions of universal justice purporting to measure the European particularism of jus gentium, then it quickly becomes apparent that each is embedded in local intellectual culture -in a specific moral anthropology and cosmology -that is itself regional to and within Europe. Moreover, as we shall Imperialism, Sovereignty, pp. 8-9, 31-20; and, more generally, Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason; and Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993 see in more detail in section III, these intellectual cultures are responsible not only for representing global justice in a particular form -as a world of self-determining nations, self-governing cosmopolitan rational beings, or self-transformative self-other dyads -but also for constituting different ways of knowing or acceding to the truth of global justice. Drawing on the long history of Christian Aristotelianism, Catholic natural law posits man as the bearer of a nascent 'rational and sociable nature' or selfdeveloping essence. The realisation or 'perfection' of this essence imbues man's conduct with a teleological-developmental character that makes justice thinkable as 'self-determination' and means that international justice will be thought in terms of the equal rights to self-determination of corporate moral persons or 'nations'.
Conversely, Kantian moral anthropology, developed in part as a Protestant rival to Thomist Aristotelianism, treats humanity as a community of pure intelligences whose wills must be harmonised to achieve a just (cosmopolitan) occupation of the surface of the earth.
19 For its part the post-Kantian metaphysics of transcendental phenomenology requires European states to be thought of as inauthentic selves formed through the occlusion of a self-manifesting 'other' -represented here by colonised peoples -thereby constituting the postcolonial theorist as someone who accedes to knowledge of justice in the form of the renovatory self-manifestation of the repressed other.
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There are thus good prima facie reasons for suggesting that when the universalist critique of jus gentium presumes a norm of global justice -when it is tacitly or explicitly asserted that all nations have a right to self-determination, or that all states should harmonise their interests in accordance with a principle of 'cosmopolitan right', or that all colonisers construct their identity through 'anxious' occlusion of the colonised -this amounts to neither more nor less than the iteration of a series of world is organised around a privileged 'middle kingdom' -centre of civilisationor is divided into regions of the 'abode of Islam ' (dar al-Islam) and the 'abode of war ' (dar al-harb) , and so on. Given their reliance on rival philosophical anthropologies and modes of acceding to truth, however, then it is equally implausible to imagine that the three European forms of 'global justice' can be reconciled among each other. It is thus reasonable to suggest that the main ways of measuring the European particularity of jus gentium against a global justice are themselves embedded in intellectual cultures that are not only regional to Europe but are also regional within Europe.
We are thus raising the prospect that the postcolonial critique of a Eurocentric jus gentium is not only deeply enmeshed in European academic philosophy, but that the global philosophical history through which it seeks to localise jus gentium is itself local to those geointellectual regions in which European academic philosophy has been planted. In arguing that the philosophical-historical critique of jus gentium Eurocentrism is itself Eurocentric, our aim is not to engage in some kind of 'metacritique' -as if Eurocentrism could be determined in relation to some truly universal norm or history that this critique has yet to realise -but to head in a different direction altogether. Our concern rather is to acknowledge -indeed to insist onthe particularist or regional European character of jus gentium intellectual cultures, but to argue that this regionality is indefeasible on purely intellectual grounds; that is, on the grounds of a 'global principle of justice' and a 'universal history' of the kind presumed by its critical historiography, which turn out themselves to be regional to and within Europe.
In fact there are compelling historical reasons for thinking that the regionality of European jus gentium 'universalism' became comprehensible and contestable not through rational philosophical reflection or universal history, but as a result of two highly contingent sets of historical developments taking place in the a-rational domain of cultural and political-military conflict. Firstly, the universalism of natural law and jus gentium was forcibly fractured from within Europe when, during the Christian 'Reformation' of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there emerged rival natural-law universalisms backed by warring religious and political orders. By drawing on these two approaches we can offer an historical discussion of the European regionality of jus gentium that does not measure this against a global justice and universal history, and hence does not treat this particularism as a symptom of moral error or as a source of political and juridical malfeasance. In so doing we call into question whether the cultural and political relations in which jus gentium discourses were enmeshed -not just the relations between European and nonEuropean peoples but also the relations between Europe's warring moral communities -could have been brought within a single compass of intelligibility and moral or legal judgment, and hence whether they can be today. As a result, rather than a unifying principle of theoretical intelligibility -in which jus gentium discourses are forced to walk the single line between ideology and truth -what emerges is an historical account that disperses these discourses across a variety of contexts. Such were the contexts formed by the rival European intellectual cultures that jus gentium discourses embodied, and the clashing cultural and political programs for whose purposes they mobilised these cultures. (2000), 1-66, where at p. 7 we find the comment: 'What is critical is the question of the scope of a society in which a certain normative system is valid and applied. Whether "ancient international law", the Islamocentric siyar, the Sinocentric tribute system or Eurocentric law of nations, they are nothing other than regional normative systems which were applied in only a limited area of the earth and lasted for a limited period of time'. This is a salutory observation, although Onuma's 'intercivilisational' perspective overunifies the different 'civilisations' and thus fails to take into account the plurality and rivalry of European jus gentium cultures.
II
The European genre of jus naturae et gentium did not originate as the ideology of sixteenth-century colonialism and it did not lead to nineteenth-century imperialism.
It neither sprang from the head of Franciso de Vitoria nor fell at the feet of Prince Leopold of the Congo. The law of nature and nations was not an ideology organised around a body of ideas -state sovereignty, the rule of law, agricultural and commercial society -that had emerged to do the repressive bidding of early modern colonial states, and would continue to play this role for their modern imperialist successors. Rather, it was a sprawling disciplinary clearing-house that had emerged during the thirteenth century, in order to provide an ordering matrix for Europe's theological, juridical, and political cultures, and from which a bewildering variety of 'ideologies' and 'sciences' (Wissenschaften) arose in particular historical contexts.
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The 'juridical' legitimation of European religious and commercial intrusions into the New World was indeed one of the contextual uses to which this genre was put, as has been shown in an array of important studies.
27 It needs to be carefully observed though that this use was not the unifying essence of jus gentium discourses, and that these intrusions could be and were justified on grounds -of Christian proselytising, dynastic ambition, military competition, economic wealth-creation -quite independent of the quasi-juridical ones offered by natural law and jus gentium.
With this sense of the outer limits of jus naturae and gentium in place, we can turn to its radical internal diversity. Drawing on both Christian theology and the heritage of Roman law -and initially tied to the twin institutions of the Papacy and the Holy Roman German Empire -the first iterations of jus naturae et gentium were fundamentally theological-juridical. 28 This theological inheritance remained signposted in the name 'natural law' itself, which refers to a law that is supposed to be natural in a two-fold sense: firstly, in being inscribed in and as man's 'rational and sociable nature' by God; and secondly in being acceded to through man's 'natural'
reason, as opposed to through revelation or positive proclamation. all men on the basis of their shared rational and sociable nature, and thus to form the basis of a jus gentium or law of nations common to all 'civilised' peoples.
Nonetheless, owing in part to the centripetal disciplines of theology, law and politics that it sought to harmonise, and in part to the variety of competing ways in which its key intellectual components were specified and assembled, jus naturae et gentium was not a single body of doctrine. It was rather a shifting intellectual matrix in which a variety of cross-cutting and finally mutually inimical theological, juridical and political doctrines could be formulated.
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From the beginning, and with greater intensity with the onset of the 'Reformation', the notion of a single universal natural law was mocked by the diversity of its conflicting constructions. These varied radically and fundamentally as a result of the incorporation of competing theological psychologies and philosophical anthropologies for human nature (as latently sociable, inherently fractious, rationally self-governing, irrationally passionate); conflicting conceptions of natural law (as man's mode of acceding to divine law, or as a practical rule derived from selfobservation); rival ways of constructing civil authority (as grounded in an agreement to execute divine or natural right, versus a contract of mutual security); and conflicting ways of relating positive civil law to theological natural law (the former being sometimes treated as dependent on the latter and sometimes as its replacement).
Rather than an ideological doctrine for European imperialism, the law of nature and nations supplied a gestational matrix for a wide variety of political philosophies, 30 and for a diversity of reception-contexts for various kinds of positive law: Romano-canon law, regional common law, and imperial jus publicum (particularly as related to the religious peace treaties of 1555 and 1648). From among the diversity of forms of jus naturae et gentium that emerged in early modernity we can make brief mention of three broad types that are of particular significance for our present concerns. First, the high-point of confessional conflict during the late-sixteenth and early seventeenth century marked the dominance of scholastic theological constructions of natural law. Drawing on Christian-Aristotelian and Christian-Platonic sources, these constructions treated natural law as man's 'natural' mode of acceding to divine law, for which the theologians and clergy were the privileged interpreters. They were designed to provide a theocratic reception- 
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As a result of its dependence on post-Kantian conceptions of theory and universal history, the critical historiography of jus gentium and international law assumes the form of a philosophical hermeneutics. We have already observed that this historiography uses the theory-practice dichotomy to divide jus gentium into an ideological form -characterised by the particularistic 'complicity' of its ideas with the material interests of colonialism -and a (potentially) true form, whose ideas comprehend global justice, or will be globalised by a universal history. This is the hermeneutic grid that critical historiography imposes on the sprawling and variegated contextual history of jus naturae et gentium. Under this grid, any given jus gentium text or discourse can be interpreted by purporting to discern the degree of particularism (ideology) or universality (truth) of its ideas -of moral personality, political authority, justice, and so on. This is in turn is treated as symptomatic of the discourse's relative place in a progressive universal history leading to the universal conception of justice from which the critical interpreter looks back on the particularistic ignorance or universalistic prescience of his intellectual ancestors.
In practice, this philosophical-hermeneutic method routinely produces quite contradictory interpretations of any given jus gentium discourse or author. We have already observed that Vitoria is attacked by some modern commentators for foisting Approached on their own methodological grounds -that is, from the viewpoint of philosophical-historical hermeneutics -there is nothing to choose between these rival interpretations. Given the hermeneutic grid, it is always possible to interpret jus gentium ideas as symptomatic either of Eurocentric self-interest or of universal justice, and thence to measure their historical distance from the 'promise' of a true idea of international justice bestowed on the interpreter. In this way, the hermeneutic approach establishes a relation of reciprocal dependency between the ideological or true character of ideas (on the one hand) and their historical effectivity (on the other).
Some ideas -state sovereignty, the rule of law -are interpreted as Eurocentric by positing a complicity with colonialism that is supposed to be symptomatic of their derogation from universal justice, which means that these ideas must have been effectually complicit with colonialism because they were indeed Eurocentric.
Similarly, other ideas -man's 'rational and sociable being', the 'cosmopolitan principle of right' -are interpreted as universal by positing a process of historical development that is bringing them to global fruition, which means that such a process of globalisation must be effectually taking place as these ideas are indeed universal. WolffLiteratur (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1986), pp. 266-77; and Marcel Thomann, 'Die Bedeutung historical effects (as repressive or emancipatory) from the texts themselves, without investigating how they were received and used in particular historical contexts.
In order to break free of this philosophical-hermeneutic stranglehold on the history of jus gentium it is necessary to move in two directions simultaneously. First, if we are to understand the significance of natural law and jus gentium discourses in particular contexts then it is necessary to bracket the supposed truth or falsity of their ideas and focus instead on what these discourses were 'doing', particularly on their role in forming the persona of the natural-law jurist, understood as a particular way of acceding to the truth of religious, political and juridical ideas. Second, if we are to understand how these discourses were received and used in particular contextsincluding colonial contexts -then we must jettison the idea that this took place via a dialectics of ideas and material determinations, governed by the logic of repression and emancipation. Instead, we must investigate the particular religious, juridical and political programs for whose purposes jus gentium discourses were fashioned, and in whose conflicts they were enmeshed, treating the history of jus gentium and international law as in effect the history of these conflicts.
On the first side of the equation, the hermeneutic dialectic of ideas and material determinations is undermined by the eminently material and historical character of the intellectual components of the law of nature and nations themselves. If we examine these components -the moral theologies or philosophical anthropologies, the metaphysical and anti-metaphysical conceptions of natural law, the speculative histories of property or sovereignty, and so on -then what we encounter are not true or false ideas as such. Rather, we are confronted by a diverse array of intellectual practices or cultures through whose formative effects ideas or beliefs are acceded to in particular ways, 'offices' or personae. Koskenneimi has thus argued that to understand modern international law it is not the doctrinal ideas of the jurists that matters but their shared 'sensibility', formed on the basis of a broad philosophical and moral culture. 63 In a similar vein, a research collaboration in which I have participated With regard to what is being 'done' with the discourses of jus naturae et gentium, and their role in forming particular ways of acceding to truth and justice, we should pay particular attention to the formative uses of the philosophical anthropologies and cosmologies that they contain. In Vitoria's case, for example, the Thomist-Aristotelian anthropology of man's 'rational and sociable nature' -where reason is both the developmental law inscribed by God in man's nature, and the means by which man becomes conscious of this law through an exercise that touches God's rational nature ('synderesis') -permits Vitoria to claim a privileged role for the cadre of Catholic theologians. As learned body whose cultivation of reason permits them to accede to the objective moral laws inscribed in man's nature by God, the theologians claimed the role of steering the exercise of civil authority in accordance with these laws. 68 This included its exercise to discipline the Indians should the latter resist the proselytising intended to realise the laws embedded in the universal nature that they shared with their Spanish colonisers. Vitoria's jus gentium is thus acceded to in the persona and office of the learned and holy theologian whose because in envisaging his own cosmopolitan jus gentium as the product of the harmonised wills of a universe of rational beings, Kant saw himself acceding to the principle of justice in a different kind of persona: that of the philosopher who channeled this rational general will into the world of empirical law and politics.
Kant's claim to have superseded his 'merely empirical' predecessors by recovering a universal theory of justice is thus undermined by the fact that it relies on the 'arbitrary' or historical privileging of a particular discursive 'ritual' for acceding to justice: as 'universal theory'. More generally, the rival intellectual cultures informing the history of jus gentium cannot be distributed along a single universal philosophical-historical path leading from the ideological (particularistic) to the true (universal), as each represents a particularistic means of acceding to 'universal truth'.
The intellectual history of jus gentium is thus a history of unfinished contestation between rival intellectual cultures. Today Catholic apologists thus continue to champion Vitoria's mode of acceding to truth -through theological insight into the law of man's 'rational and sociable nature' -while other (de facto Protestant) philosophers extol Kant's channeling of the rational common will as the only way to accede to universal justice.
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On the other side of dialectical equation, the historical effects of various jus gentium discourses cannot be read-off from the particularistic character of their constituent ideas: as if this were a sign of their 'complicity' with material interests that are in turn advanced by the particularistic or Eurocentric character of these ideas.
We have argued to the contrary that all jus gentium discourses have been irretrievably particularistic -in the sense of regional to and within Europe -as a result of the rival intellectual cultures within which they were elaborated and the conflicting religious, juridical and political programs for which they were elaborated. What historical effects might or might not have arisen at the nexus of various jus gentium discourses and particular religious, juridical and political programs is thus not 69 Immanuel Kant, 'Toward Perpetual Peace', in M. J. Gregor (ed.), Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 311-52, at 326-27. 70 In this regard, compare the defence of Vitoria in Tierney's Idea of Natural Rights, [290] [291] [292] [293] [294] [295] [296] [297] [298] [299] [300] [301] something that can be read-off from the putative signs of their ideological particularism or, conversely, their rational universalism. Rather, this is something that can only be determined through historical investigation of how such discourses were received and used within contexts defined by the relations between concrete cultural and political forces. It is the contingent and often unfinished interactions between these forces that constitutes the inherently unstable 'present' from which the history of jus gentium must be written.
In order to provide some sense of the use of jus gentium discourses within an appropriately concrete colonial context, I will draw on a body of recent investigations into the uses of English law in colonial New Zealand and Australia. Consider the comment in the journal of the Aborigine's Protection Society -The Colonial Intelligencer or Aborigines' Friend -of 1847, that 'the important point to remember is this, that the New Zealanders will not stop to ask us to define territorial rights for them, nor will they defer to the authority of writers on the Jus Gentium'. Cited in Hickford, 'Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages, p. 162.
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Reynolds thus cites evangelical-Christian recognition of Aboriginal land rights as evidence for the fact that Europeans knew that such rights existed and used Eurocentric legal and political ideologies in order to hide this fact. See Reynolds, The Law of the Land, ch. iv. Despite his acknowledgment that this recognition was premised on the imposition of a universalist Christian metaphysical anthropology -parallel to the one we have discussed with regard to Vitoria -Reynolds fails to note that this meant that such recognition was internal to a program of conversion and religious pedagogy corrosive of Aboriginal cosmogonies and their associated cultural practices. See, for example, Chitty in Vattel, Law of Nations, footnote 107, pp. 166ff. Here Chitty adds a three-page comment to Vattel's remark that, in order to preserve friendship among nations, the exercise of national jurisdiction over resident aliens should be accepted by their home sovereigns. Rather than addressing itself as general advice to statesmen, Chitty's comment -which is focused on the seizure of enemy 'prize' ships by the English Admirality Court -summarises 'the long-established doctrine in England, and … the more recent general practice of European nations', and is embedded in a web of English case-law citations and authoritative judgments. and George Grey as governor of New Zealand (1845), both notable supporters of the New Zealand Company. It was this political change that provided the ideology with the political force that allowed it to shape George Grey's land distribution policy: the policy of extensive government land purchases as a means of extinguishing broad native title and reconstructing this title in terms of the reserved proprietorship of limited horticultural holdings 84 As Hickford comments: 'What was at stake was not merely control of the rationale for policy but the manner in which it would be executed in practice irrespective of legal niceties. In essence, the question of defining public policy (and the history of its practice) had much to do with power and authority over those processes that beget desired outcomes in the first place'.
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Finally, we can observe that even if -perhaps especially if -the colonial effectivity of jus gentium concepts of sovereignty and property hinged upon their 82 Hickford, 'Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages', pp.123-33. 83 Hickford, 'Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages', pp.151-55. 84 Hickford, 'Decidedly the Most Interesting Savages', pp. 160-65. 
